Naval War College Review
Volume 72
Number 2 Spring 2019

Article 10

2019

The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22:
Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George
John B. Hattendorf
G. H. Bennett

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Hattendorf, John B. and Bennett, G. H. (2019) "The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under
Lloyd George," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 2 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Hattendorf and Bennett: The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreig

BOOK REVIEWS

HIGHS AND LOWS
The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George, by
G. H. Bennett. London: Bloomsbury, 2016. 296 pages. $120 (paperback $39.95, e-book $28.76).

Royal Navy captain Stephen Roskill’s
1968 study Naval Policy between
the Wars (Naval Institute Press) has
dominated the historiographical scene
on this subject for half a century. G. H.
Bennett’s volume now successfully adds
much depth and new understanding
to the naval policies of Prime Minister
David Lloyd George’s government in the
immediate aftermath of the First World
War. Bennett’s volume follows, but with
a much different focus, Erik Goldstein
and John Maurer’s The Washington
Conference 1921–22 (Routledge, 1994)
and Donald Lisio’s British Naval
Supremacy and Anglo-American
Antagonisms, 1914–1930 (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2014). Rather than following the traditional approach to this
period of concentrating on international
diplomacy and external issues, Bennett
demonstrates “a multifaceted approach
rooted in political and naval history
but opening up new and cutting-edge
debates in other areas of historical study
to transform traditional debates” (p. xiv).
Laudably, Bennett seeks an approach
to naval history that breaks down the
artificial barriers that place the study of
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navies in a watertight compartment and
isolate it from “total history” and the
broader patterns of relevant linkages in
political, military, economic, business,
social, gender, and labor history.
The works of Volker Berghahn, Jon
Sumida, and Samuel P. Huntington
have had an impact on Bennett’s focus.
Significantly, Bennett’s approach reflects
the parallels he sees in the 1919–22
period with the issues surrounding
British naval policies in the second
decade of the twenty-first century.
In opening his sensitive and innovative
study of this three-year period, Bennett
points out that Lloyd George’s government had a particularly tricky range of
problems to balance after World War I.
While other recent historians have interpreted the period as one of discontinuity
in British naval and defense policies,
Bennett sees continuity. The inability of
the government to “get it right” in the
area of naval policy was a direct result
of the size and complexity of the issues
that it faced. The difficulty lay in the
interconnectedness of naval policy with
government politics, the private sector,
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and communities. As Samuel Huntington would have put it, British naval
policy had been in a state of “disequilibrium” even before the beginning of the
First World War, and this continued into
the postwar period. Britain’s economy
was declining in comparison with
other national economies; changing
technology and weapons were rendering obsolete Britain’s investment in its
battleship fleet; and other countries,
notably Japan and the United States, had
the potential to build navies that would
end British naval mastery. British leaders
correctly saw these developments as
significant threats to the security, stability, and future of the British Empire.
In the immediate postwar era, Britain
faced massive war debts, along with a
range of severe social and political issues
complicated by unemployment, labor
unrest, and the rise of socialism. These
issues combined to create challenges
to the existing social, economic, and
political order. In trying to create naval
policies in this complex environment,
the Lloyd George government made its
national security decisions on the basis
of what it might be able to afford rather
than on preparing for the worst-case
scenario. That worst-case situation, of
course, was the war that would occur
twenty years later, but that neither the
government nor the British voter could
contemplate so soon after the horrific
events of World War I. Ministers were
forced to balance naval preparedness for
a future war against national bankruptcy
and the fears of a socialist victory by
election or revolution. In this situation,
Lloyd George placed his ministry’s
priority solely on the financial consideration and the reduction of public
spending rather than on a considered
analysis of the strategic situation and
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the likelihood of war. The ministry’s
institution in 1919 of the “ten-year rule”
in defense planning effectively excluded
the possibility of thinking about war.
As Bennett points out, this was in one
sense a logical and pragmatic approach,
but it forced the Royal Navy and the
other armed services to find alternative
explanations for keeping the service
in a state of preparedness to deal with
the future security of Britain and the
empire. While the service turned to
effective arguments such as showing that
battleship construction helped reduce
unemployment, Bennett argues that
this undermined a clear understanding
of the purpose and value of the navy,
harming it in the long run. He goes
on to argue that the ten-year rule had
a pernicious and long-term effect by
establishing the precedent that leaders
could make competent defense decisions
without an assessment of strategic needs
and threats. Bennett underscores the
lesson from this period that political
imperatives cannot compromise strategic threat assessments and decisions.
“Dangers must be identified and noted,
even if the means to meet them are not
immediately at hand” (pp. 179–80).
Bennett’s book is a significant contribution to naval history. Not only
does it provide a new interpretation
of historical events, but it does so by
placing the navy in a much broader
context. While other scholars may
argue points of interpretation, his
vision in bringing about a broader
understanding of the naval dimensions
of this period is a model for others to
follow and apply. Equally important,
his volume has much to say to current
practitioners and strategic planners.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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